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as a name for the basic coordinates of human subjectivity: the 
modality of intersubjective love and understanding.”
17. Working Group of the International Imagination of Anti-National 
and Anti-Imperialist Feelings (IIAAF), “Strike MoMA: Framework 
and Terms for Struggle,” Strike MoMA, https://www.strikemoma.
org.
18. This last sentence is to be read along with Fanon’s initial lines 
in the introduction of Black Skin, White Masks: “Don’t expect to 
see any explosion today. It’s too early . . . or too late. I’m not 
the bearer of absolute truths. No fundamental inspiration has 
flashed across my mind. I honestly think, however, it’s time some 
things were said. Things I’m going to say, not shout. I’ve long 
given up shouting. A long time ago . . .” See Frantz Fanon, Black 
Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Wilcox (New York: Grove Press, 
2008): xi.
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In 2002, I was a student in a political science course at the 
City University of New York’s LaGuardia Community College. 
At this time, I was working fifty to fifty-five hours a week in 
a warehouse in the Woodside, Queens section of New York 
City, and I was also living with my grandmother, mother, and 
brother in a one-bedroom apartment in Jackson Heights, 
Queens. As a result, I often did not have the space, time, 
and energy to devote to producing high-quality essays or 
coursework. But from time to time, circumstances would 
allow me the space, time, and energy that I needed to 
produce high-quality work. 
On one of these occasions, I managed to produce a 
good short essay in this political science course. The 
instructor’s comment on my work was simply that “I must 
have plagiarized some published political science work” 
because, by his lights, there was no way that I could have 
produced work of this quality or be aware of the historical 
facts that I referenced in the essay. This instructor clearly 
based his false inference on a false assumption about 
the capacity of Black and Latinx students at LaGuardia 
Community College. But he also based this inference on 
the false assumption that the work that I produced in the 
past represented the highest quality of work that I could 
produce. This assumption, I submit, betrayed his ignorance 
of how racial injustice can negatively affect the conditions 
under which Black, Indigenous, and Latinx persons produce 
philosophical essays or work. I assume that if he had 
understood how racial injustice relates to these conditions, 
then the likelihood that he would have erred in this way 
would have been depressed. 
Leaving aside many of the political and moral features 
of this case, this political-science instructor made two 
kinds of judgment. The first kind of judgment is about 
the quality of a student’s philosophical work. The second 
kind of judgment is about a student’s general capacity 
or disposition to produce philosophical work of a certain 
quality level. Instructors’ bailiwick seemingly involves 
precisely these kinds of judgments about students. This 
essay’s aim is to get clear on how racial injustice relates 
and the conference that commemorated the 40th anniversary 
of the birth of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, 
Berkeley: “Decolonizing the University: Fulfilling the Dream of 
the Third World College,” see https://vimeo.com/15729523.
9. Among other sources, see the special issue of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the founding of Ethnic Studies in the Ethnic 
Studies Review 42, no. 2 (Fall 2019), https://online.ucpress.edu/
esr/issue/42/2.
10. See the Ethnic Studies Now Coalition, https://www.
ethnicstudiesnow.com, and Akinbiyi Akinlabi et al., “Letter from 
Black and Indigenous Faculty and Faculty of Color who Specialize 
in the Study of Race at Rutgers, New Brunswick,” https://sites.
google.com/view/rutgers-blm-bipoc-lettter/home.
11. I have written about my experience as a philosophy student 
in Puerto Rico and about doing philosophy in Ethnic Studies 
in “Thinking at the Limits of Philosophy and Doing Philosophy 
Elsewhere: From Philosophy to Decolonial Thinking,” in Reframing 
the Practice of Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge, 
ed. George Yancy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012): 251–70. I was 
fortunate to find in Lewis Gordon and Enrique Dussel supportive 
teachers, advisors, and mentors while in graduate school, and 
to closely collaborate with the late Latina philosopher María 
Lugones since my early years as an Assistant Professor. The 
Caribbean Philosophical Association offered an important space 
for the kind of work that we pursued.
12. See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).
13. The most recent work of Rocio Zambrana is an example of this. 
See Colonial Debts: The Case of Puerto Rico (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2021). Also of crucial importance are works 
in Puerto Rico by Anayra Santory Jorge, whose publications, 
classes, as well as her initiatives while chair of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, played 
an important role motivating and supporting a new generation of 
philosophy students with interests in decolonization and who are 
now in the process of completing their PhDs. This includes Pedro 
Lebrón, author of the recently published Filosofía del cimarronaje 
(Toa Baja: Editora Educación Emergente, 2020). From Anayra 
Santory Jorge, see, among others: Nada es igual: bocetos del 
país que nos acontece (Toa Alta: Editora Educación Emergente, 
2018); Convidar (Toa Alta: Editora Educación Emergente, 2020); 
and the co-edited anthology Antología del pensamiento crítico 
puertorriqueño, eds. Anayra Santory Jorge and Mareia Quintero 
Rivera (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2019). Another important 
author and teacher in Puerto Rico whose work in the history of 
Caribbean and Puerto Rican philosophy has animated interest 
in the philosophical exploration of questions and themes that 
are prevalent in the island-archipelago and the Caribbean is 
the Colombian-born Carlos Rojas Osorio, winner of the 2005 
Frantz Fanon Lifetime Achievement Award by the Caribbean 
Philosophical Association.
14. I have developed related ideas about the meaning of philosophy 
in Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality 
and Decoloniality,” as well as in the co-authored chapter 
“Decolonising Philosophy.” See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, 
Rafael Vizcaíno, Jasmine Wallace, and Jeong Eun Annabel We 
in Decolonising the University, eds. Gurminder Bhambra, Dalia 
Gebrail, and Kerem Nisancioglu (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 
64–90. See also Lewis Gordon, Disciplinary Decadence: Living 
Thought in Trying Times (Boulder, Co.: Paradigm Press, 2006), and 
Lewis Gordon, “Decolonizing Philosophy,” The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 57 ,no. S1 (2019): 16–36.
15. As evinced in the “Outline of Ten Theses,” the works of Frantz 
Fanon and Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism have been 
crucial in the formulation of this view of philosophy and its 
operations and mutations in colonial settings. See Aimé Césaire, 
Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2000).
16. I am building here from a view of philosophy presented in 
Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and 
Decoloniality,” where I write: “That is, while philosophy is 
traditionally conceived as the love of wisdom, for Fanon, or 
rather through Fanon, we can conceive of philosophy as the 
intersubjective modality of love and understanding. Philosophy 
is therefore not simply a particular form of questioning or 
production of knowledge that characterizes the work of some 
people called philosophers. Rather, philosophy can be conceived 
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To motivate the RACIAL-INJUSTICE-ASSESSMENT THESIS, I 
will defend the ACCURACY THESIS and the JUSTICE THESIS. 
According to the ACCURACY THESIS, the accuracy of an 
instructor’s judgment of a student’s work will covary with 
the degree to which she considers how racial injustice 
affects the performance enshrined in the student’s the 
work. According to the JUSTICE THESIS, the justness of 
instructors’ judgments of student work covary with the 
degree to which instructors consider racial injustice’s effect 
on student work. 
The argument that I present will take the following form. 
If (P) the ACCURACY THESIS is true and the JUSTICE THESIS 
is true, then (C) RACIAL-INJUSTICE-ASSESSMENT THESIS is 
true. I show that (P), thus (C) obtains.
THE ACCURACY THESIS
I now defend the ACCURACY THESIS. According to this thesis, 
the accuracy of an instructor’s judgment of a student’s 
work will covary with the degree to which she considers 
how racial injustice affects the performance enshrined in 
the student’s work. To defend this, I will present cases that 
illustrate how racial injustice affects the performance that a 
student’s work enshrines.
Take Yuderky. She is an Afro-Latinx Dominican 
undergraduate student in philosophy at a public university 
in New York City. She lives in the south Bronx in a one-
bedroom apartment with three siblings and her mother. 
Her mother is an immigrant from the countryside in the 
Dominican Republic who speaks no English and received 
only a primary school education. To help make ends 
meet, Yuderky works forty hours a week while she attends 
university full time to complete a philosophy BA. And she 
has attended New York City public primary and secondary 
schools that underserved her in terms of the rudiments of 
writing, such as favoring the active rather than the passive 
voice.1
Now take Chad. He is a White-Anglo-Saxon Protestant man 
undergraduate in philosophy at the same public university 
in New York City. He lives in the Upper West Side of 
Manhattan in a three-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment 
with his one sibling and parents. His parents provide him 
more than enough funds so that he can devote as much 
time as his academic work requires. He attended private 
primary and secondary schools in Manhattan that played 
a crucial role in the development of his capacity to write 
clear prose.
Yuderky and Chad are in the same upper-level ethics course 
with Professor Smith. This course involves a seven-to-ten-
page term paper in which they defend a thesis. Professor 
Smith clearly communicates to students of this class what is 
expected in terms of clarity and rigor. He also makes himself 
available to discuss paper topics and arguments during his 
office hours, which he holds at 2 p.m. twice a week.
Professor Smith gives Yuderky’s essay a grade of A-. Her 
essay is good, but not worthy of an A+ in his eyes because 
it does not satisfy the criteria it must meet to receive an 
A+. On the other hand, Chad’s essay receives a grade of A+ 
because his essay satisfies these criteria.
to these kinds of judgments and how instructors can do 
better by way of these judgments. 
Instructors at the university level who care to take racial 
injustice into account when they assess their students’ work 
face a challenge. This challenge is that we, instructors, also 
care to assess students’ work according to university-level 
academic standards of quality, such as clarity of prose and 
argumentative rigor.
In the discipline of philosophy, as in other disciplines, 
instructors often refer to their students as “good” or “bad” 
while discussing their students with other instructors. 
A charitable interpretation of how instructors use these 
terms to describe their students is that a student is “good” 
if she performs in accordance with some evaluative 
academic standard and, similarly, a student is “bad” if her 
performance does not accord with this academic standard.
With this academic standard in mind, instructors often 
judge students as “good” or “bad” on the basis of the 
work that a student submits over the course of a semester. 
Here the assessment of a student’s work can differ from 
an instructor’s judgment of her as a student who can 
produce “good” work. Good students can turn in bad work 
and bad students can turn in good work according to this 
conception of how students relate to their work. I will call 
the disposition that students have to produce good or bad 
work academic character. 
I assume that instructors often judge students’ academic 
character on the basis of how they have judged their work. 
I take it as commonplace that instructors judge a student’s 
academic character good because she has turned in good 
work and vice versa. 
I also assume that the academic-character judgments that 
instructors make of a student will tend to affect whether 
they afford a student leeway or give them the benefit of the 
doubt in terms of handing in assignments late, arriving late 
to class, deciding whether to give students the higher of 
two grades when they are on the borderline, and awarding 
course grades of incomplete rather than a failing grade for 
a course.
The picture that I am painting involves how assessment of 
a student’s work affects assessment of academic character 
and then, in turn, affects the final grades that students 
receive in a course. This affects students in terms of their 
grade point averages and whether faculty are willing to 
write letters of recommendation for law school or graduate 
school. As a result, accurate and just assessment seemingly 
matters quite a bit for our students’ life plans and goals.
I will argue that just and accurate assessment must involve 
taking into account how racial injustice affects students’ 
performance in their work. To this end, I will motivate 
what I call the RACIAL-INJUSTICE-ASSESSMENT THESIS. 
According to this thesis, instructors must account for how 
racial injustice affects a student’s work for an instructor’s 
judgment of her work to count as just. 
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work consumes the lion’s share of her time such that she 
has comparatively little time to devote to developing her 
philosophical work, and (3) the comparatively depressed 
level of preparation she received in primary and secondary 
schools in terms of the clarity of her writing.
But racial injustice also explains Yuderky’s internal condition. 
Racial injustice explains (1) the level of psychological stress 
she undergoes as a result of working forty hours a week 
while attempting to produce high-quality philosophical 
work,4 (2) why she sustains elevated levels of cognitive load 
due to tracking whether interlocutors misperceive her as 
not credible or not a knower because of anti-Black Woman 
prejudices, such as the angry-Black Woman stereotype,5 
and (3) a generally elevated level of stress that results from 
dealing with the possibility of police maltreatment in the 
south Bronx.6
Chad’s external and internal conditions are comparatively 
much better because he benefits from racial injustice. In 
terms of external conditions, racial injustice explains (1) 
why he has tranquil environs in which he can complete his 
philosophical work, (2) why he need not engage in wage 
work, and (3) why he received ample preparation in primary 
and secondary schools in terms of the clarity of his writing. 
In terms of his internal conditions, racial injustice explains 
(1) the lack of psychological stress that he faces from having 
to both engage in wage work and work on philosophy, (2) 
why he benefits from positive prejudices and stereotypes 
regarding White-Anglo-Saxon Protestant men,7 and (3) 
why he lacks any significant levels of stress due to worries 
about police harassment. 
THE JUSTICE THESIS
According to the JUSTICE THESIS, the justness of instructors’ 
judgments of student work covary with the degree to which 
instructors consider racial injustice’s effect on student 
work. I now present a reason that motivates the JUSTICE 
THESIS.
This reason is what I call the INJUSTICE-PROMOTION 
REASON. According to this reason, that an instructor 
errantly judges, because he does not take racial injustice 
into account, can promote racial injustice. Erring in this 
way promotes and sustains the disadvantage that Black, 
Indigenous, and Latinx students suffer as a result of racial 
injustice.
Take Professor Smith. He errantly judges that Yuderky’s work 
is not as good as Chad’s work because he does not take into 
account how racial injustice affects Yuderky’s performance 
conditions in comparison to Chad’s conditions. Suppose 
that a result of this is that Yuderky will receive a lower grade 
and thus grade point average, a letter of recommendation 
with a depressed level of praise and less commitment and 
guidance from Smith because he thinks Chad has the best 
odds of gaining admittance to a good graduate program or 
law school. 
Smith’s judgment of Yuderky promotes and sustains 
racial injustice because this judgment sustains Yuderky’s 
disadvantaged position. That Smith does not take 
Yuderky regularly receives grades of A-, and Chad regularly 
receives grades of A+. At a faculty meeting, someone asks 
Professor Smith whether Yuderky or Chad is a “better” 
student. Smith answers that despite the good quality 
of Yuderky’s work, Chad’s is excellent and thus he is a 
“better” student. Here, Smith judges on the basis of the 
work that Yuderky and Chad turn in that Chad is a better 
student. But Smith does not consider how racial injustice 
affects the philosophical performance that is enshrined 
in the work that they turn in. I assume that defending a 
thesis by presenting reasons or premises in an essay and 
clearly explaining relevant philosophical views is a kind of 
philosophical performance that can be judged more or less 
successful and thus more or less “good” according to some 
academic standard of clarity and rigor. That is, I assume 
that the philosophical argument and exposition enshrined 
in the work that students submit is a kind of performance 
that can be judged more or less successful.
Professor Smith judges Yuderky’s and Chad’s performances 
on the basis of the performance enshrined in the essays 
they submit. But here Smith judges these performances 
without considering how racial injustice affects the difficulty 
of the performance. I assume that if one actor performs an 
action under more difficult conditions than another actor’s 
outwardly identical performance, then the actor who 
performs similarly under more difficult conditions exhibits 
a higher level of skill and thus a better performance. 
Take José. He is an archer who hits his target from two 
hundred feet away in clear and calm conditions. One 
can evaluate his performance as “good” because he did 
successfully hit his target from this distance where his 
success is due to his skill rather than luck.2 But now take 
Marisol. She hits the same target from two hundred feet 
away, but under foggy and windy conditions, because of 
her skill rather than luck. One can evaluate her performance 
as even better than José’s performance because the 
conditions under which she performs it elevate its difficulty. 
These are external performance conditions that figure into 
proper judgment of their performances. 
But an actor’s internal conditions can also affect the 
difficulty of their performance.3 Famously, Michael Jordan 
exhibited an extremely high level of skill and successful 
performance in a game of the NBA finals even though he 
had an extremely high fever. Each successful sinking of 
a shot, assist, or steal in this condition can be judged as 
more difficult and thus “better” than performances by other 
players not in this condition.
Suppose that Marisol had unwittingly consumed a 
hallucinogen before she successfully hit her target. If 
both she and José hit their target from an equal distance, 
but Marisol is under the influence of a hallucinogenic 
substance, then Marisol’s internal condition elevates the 
difficulty of her performance in comparison to José’s.
Consider how racial injustice affects Yuderky’s external 
condition in terms of the philosophical performance she 
enshrines in her essay. Racial injustice explains (1) why she 
must complete her work without quiet in the apartment 
she shares with her siblings and mother, (2) that wage 
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involves false content that promotes racial injustice. This 
capacity for Smith’s judgment to promote racial injustice 
is both an example of the causal constructive power of 
instructors’ judgments and an example of how systemic 
injustice can continue to perpetuate itself.9
TWO KINDS OF ERROR 
The two cases of instructor error that I have presented 
both feature errant judgments based on bad information 
where this information is bad because it lacks inferentially 
relevant information about how racial injustice relates to 
students’ philosophical performance. But these cases can 
differ because the political science instructor could poorly 
base his judgment due to some kind of racist motive while 
Professor Smith could poorly base his judgment due to 
a lack of sensitivity of how this information evidentially 
relates to his judgment. Put simply, in the former case, 
the political science instructor’s errant judgment largely 
tracks his antecedent racist attitude about Black, Latinx, 
and Indigenous students, and in the latter case, Smith’s 
errant judgment is largely a result of not properly sensing 
how racial injustice relates to Black, Indigenous, and Latinx 
students’ performance. 
Evidence sensitivity is a notion that distinguishes these 
two cases as instances of two kinds of error. In the 
political science instructor’s case, he errs because he 
harbors a kind of a racist and thus morally noxious 
attitude that wholly or largely determines how he judges 
when it comes to the racial-injustice-information domain. 
Kristie Dotson points to this phenomenon when she 
explicates the idea of testimonial smothering.10 For 
Dotson, a Black woman suffers testimonial smothering 
if she truncates some information she would 
otherwise fully convey due to the testimonial 
incompetence of her audience. 
The case Dotson presents of this phenomenon features 
a White woman who signals her inability to 
comprehend information that Black women must raise 
their Black sons in ways that differ from how White 
woman raise their White sons in the US. That this 
White woman wittingly or unwittingly antecedently 
harbors a racist attitude towards Black persons 
explains why she is testimonially incompetent. In this 
case of testimonial smothering, this Black-woman 
speaker anticipates that a racist attitude will result in this 
White-woman hearer’s evidential insensitivity, and as a 
result, she smothers her own testimony to avoid the 
consequences of this insensitivity. The political science 
instructor, like this White-woman hearer, judges in ways that 
correspond to his racist attitude rather than his evidence. 
On the other hand, suppose that Professor Smith does 
not harbor such a racist attitude and that he errantly 
judges because he does not properly sense how racial 
injustice causally relates to the circumstances in 
which Black, Indigenous, and Latinx students 
philosophically perform. But Smith is not completely 
insensitive to this evidence. He acknowledges that 
racial injustice is relevant when considering, say, 
how schools are underfunded and how economic 
opportunities are depressed in Black, Indigenous, 
and Latinx communities even though he does not sense 
the causal relevance of racial injustice vis-à-vis his 
students’ philosophical performances. 
racial injustice’s effect on Yuderky’s performance into 
account results in the curtailment of her life chances and 
opportunities. 
Here racial injustice curtails her life chances and 
opportunities through its effect on Smith’s judgment of 
her work and also through its effect on her performance 
conditions. 
Smith’s judgment can either maximally contribute to 
this curtailment, not contribute at all to this curtailment, 
or form some degree of this curtailment. This degree 
of curtailment that his judgment comprises will in 
turn depend on what degree he takes racial injustice to 
have an effect on Yuderky’s performance. Put simply, 
whether Smith’s judgment comprises racial injustice itself 
depends on whether he takes into account racial 
injustice’s effect on the target of his judgment. 
That Smith errs in judging Chad also promotes and sustains 
racial injustice, as he does not consider that racial injustice’s 
effect o n C had’s performance c onditions p romotes a nd 
sustains the advantage that Chad, as a White student, 
enjoys as a result of racial injustice. As a consequence of 
this errant judgment, Chad will receive an elevated grade 
point average, a letter of recommendation with an elevated 
level of praise and more commitment and guidance from 
Smith than Yuderky receives because he thinks that Chad 
has the best odds of gaining admittance to a good graduate 
program or law school. 
Smith’s judgment promotes racial injustice not only in terms 
of how it shapes external features of Yuderky’s and Chad’s 
worlds, such as grade point average and likelihood of 
admittance to graduate programs, but also in terms of how 
it affects their internal features, such as their intellectual 
confidence and abilities. This errant kind of errant judgment 
is an instance of what Charles Mills calls white ignorance. 
Someone is in a white ignorant state if she falsely believes 
or lacks a true belief because of white supremacy, racial 
injustice, or anti-Black, Indigenous, or Latinx racism.8 I 
assume that this is an instance of white ignorance because 
the likelihood is infinitesimally small that white supremacy 
or racial injustice plays no causal role, whether structurally 
or psychologically, in Smith forming his false judgment.
Suppose that the performance enshrined in Chad’s and 
Yuderky’s essays are equally good if one controls for 
the differences in performance conditions that obtain 
because of racial injustice. This supposition should put into 
sharper relief that Chad gains a larger vote of confidence 
in his intellectual abilities than Yuderky even though 
their performances are the same. This difference in vote 
of confidence obtains because of racial injustice and, 
as a result, Chad unjustly benefits in this internal or self-
attitudinal way. Smith’s judgment that his essay deserves 
an A+ is a signal to Chad regarding his intellectual abilities, 
which not only involves false content, but also promotes 
racial injustice. On the other hand, Yuderky does not receive 
a similar vote of confidence in her intellectual abilities that 
she should receive from Smith because of racial injustice. 
Smith’s judgment that her essay deserves an A- is not only 
a signal to her regarding her intellectual abilities, but also 
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WHAT SHOULD INSTRUCTORS DO?
The argument that I have presented raises the issue of 
what instructors should do to avoid promoting racial 
injustice through their judgments of student work, given 
that not only do instructors have a limited amount of time 
to evaluate student work, but that they must also hold 
students to some kind of generic academic standard. 
There are at least two general ways to deal with this issue. 
The first is structural. The problem of racial injustice’s effect 
on student work is a structural one because US society’s 
structure has been shaped by centuries of racial injustice, 
white supremacy, and colonialism.11 As a consequence, any 
remedies that will make a difference for Yuderky over the 
course of her educational and academic career will affect 
the structure of society so that it depresses the degree to 
which it favors White persons over Black, Indigenous, and 
Latinx persons. 
Decreasing the amount of grading and evaluating that 
any one instructor must do by increasing the number of 
instructors, graders, or teachers’ assistants is one such 
structural remedy. The idea here is that if instructors have 
limited time to evaluate papers and decreasing the number 
of papers they must evaluate will allow them to take into 
account how racial injustice might affect the performance 
of this student, then decreasing the quantity of papers that 
instructors must grade will result in providing instructors 
with more time to consider racial injustice’s effect on 
student work. This remedy, of course, is in conflict with the 
current trend in higher education to diminish the number 
of tenure-line faculty who instruct students. But that this 
conflict obtains is a further reason for instructors to push 
back against this trend.
There are, of course, more general structural remedies, 
such as shifting the resources that White communities enjoy 
due to slavery, Indigenous genocide, and colonialism to 
Black, Indigenous, and Latinx communities. But I will only 
focus on structural remedies that, say, higher education 
administrators can implement. 
The second general way to deal with this problem is 
individualist. The problem of racial injustice’s effect on 
student work is partly an individualist one because individual 
instructors often do not consider racial injustice’s effect on 
student work. As a consequence, individual instructors can 
opt to implement policies at the course or classroom level. 
One such individualist policy is to implement grading 
policies that will tend to avert the penalty that Black, 
Indigenous, and Latinx students face when instructors 
evaluate their work. Allowing students to resubmit work that 
can be improved is an example of a policy that may tend 
to mitigate how Black, Indigenous, and Latinx students’ 
performance conditions differ from White students. This 
will allow students the room and opportunity to improve 
their work. The idea here is that if one set of students is 
disadvantaged in terms of their performance conditions, 
then allowing them to continually refine their work over 
multiple attempts will in a sense improve the condition in 
which they perform philosophical work. 
One way to distinguish Smith from the political science 
instructor is that if someone explained to Smith this 
evidence’s causal relevance, he would likely understand 
this evidential relation and believe in accordance with it. 
On the other hand, if someone explained this evidence’s 
causal relevance to the political science instructor, he 
would not understand it because his racist attitude would 
in a sense block him from understanding this evidential 
relation.
This distinction between these two kinds of errors matters 
because remedies that an education system could develop 
and implement that do not countenance this distinction will 
tend to fare poorly in comparison to remedies that do take 
this distinction into account. Remedies that countenance 
this distinction will tend to fare better because instructors 
like the political science instructor who resist evidence and 
explanation will tend to not respond to remedies that merely 
aim to inform instructors of how racial injustice relates to 
students’ performances. But remedies that not only aim 
to inform, but also disabuse or deal with instructors’ racist 
attitudes will tend to fare comparatively better because 
instructor populations will tend to consist in both kinds of 
instructors.
HOW JUSTNESS RELATES TO ACCURACY
According to the analysis that I have presented, justness 
and accuracy are distinct but related features of instructors’ 
judgments of their students. But to some, these judgment 
features might seem not to significantly differ and as 
a result these features improperly figure as distinct in 
the analysis that I have presented. I will show how these 
features are analytically distinct even though they tend to 
run together empirically.
A subject justly judges, on my account, if her judgment is 
based on evidence that takes into account how injustice 
shapes the world. For example, if a subject bases their 
judgment that “Central American persons seeking asylum 
at the US border should be granted asylum” on evidence 
that involves how racial injustice and colonialism shape 
the situations and actions of Central Americans, then this 
subject justly judges.
A subject accurately judges, on my account, if her judgment 
is true. For example, if a subject forms a true belief that 
“Central American asylum seekers should be granted 
asylum at the US border,” then this subject accurately 
judges.
Even though justness and accurateness will, in point of 
fact, tend to feature together in subjects’ judgments, they 
can come apart. For example, a US politician could base 
their judgment that “Central American asylum seekers 
should be granted asylum” not on any evidence that 
involves the causal role of injustice and colonialism but 
rather on evidence that the likelihood of their retaining 
political office is elevated if the US grants this asylum. Here 
this US politician’s judgment is accurate but not just. So 
even though these two judgment features tend to obtain 
together, they need not obtain together. 
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Paulo Freire’s conscientização: Mindful 
Awareness and Trust
Kim Díaz
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In his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), Paulo Freire 
explains how an important aspect of anyone’s liberation is 
the process of conscientização, becoming aware of both 
external oppressive dynamics such as sexism, racism, 
and how each of us has internalized these oppressive 
patterns. Freire noticed that in the attempt to facilitate 
another person’s liberation (their realization of their own 
agency and freedom) we are often met with resistance. 
This resistance comes from the oppressive patterns we 
have all internalized, and Freire suggests that, as teachers, 
we ought to believe in people’s ability to come into their 
own power. However, he also warns us to be distrustful of 
their internalized oppressive patterns. The following is an 
extension of Freire’s views and his encouragement to trust 
others in ways that recognize the challenges of internalized 
oppression. I employ this approach through the practice of 
mindfulness to trust the process of our own or another’s 
authenticity. 
1. FREIRE’S WORK
Myra Bergman Ramos translates conscientização as
“learning to perceive social, political, and economic
contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive
elements of reality.”1 According to Denis Collins, a
biographer of Freire, this critical awareness entails
developing a type of political awareness or a conscious
attitude of the oppressive dynamics in our society and
relationships.2
Now reconsider the archery case involving Marisol and 
José. If Marisol’s archery performance conditions are much 
worse than José’s conditions, then allowing her multiple 
attempts to hit her target will result in her suffering less of 
a penalty because of her performance conditions. Similarly, 
if Yuderky’s performance conditions are worse than Chad’s, 
then allowing her to submit her essay multiple times will 
result in her suffering l ess o f a p enalty b ecause o f her 
conditions. 
One might object that instructors do not have the time and 
energy to allow students multiple attempts or submissions. 
Thus, the individual proposal that I present fails. There are 
at least two responses to this objection. The first response 
cedes to the objector that indeed instructors have 
insufficient time and energy to implement this proposal. 
But it is just a brute fact that something of value must be 
exchanged or expended to remedy how Black, Indigenous, 
and Latinx students’ performance conditions generally 
differ f rom W hite students’ c onditions. W hite students’ 
performance conditions benefit from unjustly obtained 
value in terms of free slave labor,12 opportunities gained 
due to Jim Crow and redlining policies,13 and expropriating 
of Indigenous land and exploitation of Latin American 
resources through colonialism.14 As a consequence, 
remedying these conditions will take the expending of this 
value that the White power structure enjoys. There are no 
free lunches here.
A second response to this objection is that this objector 
merely points to facts that motivate structural solutions 
to this problem. Instructors will only be in a position to 
implement policies that allow them to account for this 
problem if the White power structure introduces value 
in terms of instructor salary and wages into the higher 
education system so that instructors can implement these 
policies at the individual level across the education system. 
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